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Abstract—Collaborative environments raise major challenges
to secure them. These challenges increase when it comes to the
domain of Enterprise-Social-Networks (ESNs) as ESNs aim to
incorporate the social technologies in an organization setup while
asserting greater control of information security. In this context,
the security challenges have taken a new shape as an ESN may
not be limited to the boundaries of a single organization and
users from different organizations can collaborate in a common
federated environment. In this paper, we address the problem
of the authorization’s delegation in federated collaborative en-
vironments like ESNs. In contrast to traditional XML based
languages, such as XACML, our approach is based on event-
calculus, a temporal logic programming formalism. Further, the
traditional approaches are either user-centric or organization-
centric. However, the domain of ESN requires to bridge the
gap between them and the proposed framework deals with this
challenge. In order to enhance the delegation scheme, we have
proposed a behavior monitoring mechanism, that permits to
assess principals’ trust level within the federated collaborative
environment. We evaluate our trust computing approach based on
simulated principals’ behaviors and discuss the obtained results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the last decade, enterprises social networking (ESN)
emerged. ESNs offer for professional (enterprises or more gen-
erally organizations) a new way to easily exchange informa-
tion, avoiding some abusive administrative procedures which
often could take too much time and effort. However, when
it comes to professional exchanges, the information could be
sensitive and highly confidential. Thus, such exchanges need
to be supervised and managed with great attention. This could
be managed by an access control mechanism [1] on the top
of the social environment [2], [3], [4].
Enterprise social network like Yammer1, Tibco Software
Tibbr2, or eXo3 are fundamentally collaborative environments
in which several users belonging to different organizations
could exchange data under a dynamic, trusted and secure
framework. Taking this requirement into account, we can
consider such environment as a federation [5]. From a security
point of view, this leads us to define an enterprise-social-
network as "a multitude of communities, in each of them,
involved active entities (users, organizations, web-services,...)
trust each other concerning identity attributes, and, are sub-




shared resources". The access control rules concern a user,
a resource and an action (S/O/A), and in such environment,
these rules are often defined by the owner of the resources. We
use the term subject to refer to users, principals or automated
manager components [6].
As a community is a dynamic environment, resources and
subjects tend to change frequently (i.e., add-in and/or suspend-
from the community) and could be not permanently available.
Therefore, permissions should be frequently updated to be
adapted to the real-time changes concerning community’s sub-
jects and resources availability. Such an issue is manageable
using the attribute-based access control ABAC [7]. However,
the challenge is when a subject, let’s say Bob, should quit
temporally the community, while his tasks must be performed
within the community, because they are related to an existing
process. In such case, Bob would choose another member, let’s
say Alice to replace him for performing his task(s) during
his temporal leave. However, Bob’s permissions should be
redefined to allow Alice fulfilling Bob’s tasks. This also could
be handled if Bob defines a permission(s) for Alice to access
his resource(s). However, in this case, Bob does not remain
the only main owner of the resource. Further, even if Bob is
available to complete his task(s), Alice remains able to use
Bob’s resource(s). To deal with this issue, a delegation [8],
[9], [10], [11] model could be an efficient solution. In the
literature, a delegation is defined as a temporary transfer of
access rights [6]. So, rules should be strongly time-based for
defining the validity of the granted privilege(s). Yet, it is not
trivial to manage the temporal constraints for subjects who
delegate their access rights, especially when they have a lot of
permissions to delegate.
To deal with the above mentioned issues, we have defined
a delegation process as a transfer inside a community of one
or more permissions from a subject to another belonging to
the same community. The delegated permissions are temporary
and they are only valid in the case of delegator’s4 unavailability
in the community. Therefore, the first challenge we address
in this work is to define a delegation framework that ensures
keeping subjects’ hierarchy regarding to resources ownership
(i.e., privileges).
A classical problem for delegation in real life deals with
trust. People normally must trust [12], [13] persons they del-
egate. In addition, the delagatee5 should respect the delegator
4Who delegates.
5Who gets the delegation.
access rights. That’s mean that the delegatee is supposed to
only access the delegator’s permitted resources within the
community. However, the delegatee behavior is unpredictable
and he/she may make some malicious attempts to access
unauthorized resources at the level of organizations’ servers
that host them (Fig 1). Thus, we clearly identify the relation
between subject’s trust-level and rights delegation in our ESN
context.
To deal with this challenge, we consider subjects’ trust-
level within a community as a very important criteria to
take into account for a delegation process enforcement within
a community. In addition, we aim to ensure organization’s
autonomy to control the access to the delegated resources.
This can be done by means of trust-level based constraints.
Therefore, we need to efficiently monitor subjects’ behavior
within each collaborative environment, and accordingly in-
crease and/or decrease their respective trust-levels over col-
laborative sessions within the ESN’s communities.
To summarise, we propose in this work a generic trust as-
sessment mechanism on which we build our formal delegation
framework for professional collaborative platforms. The formal
delegation framework is based on Event-Calculus [14] and is
designed to be combined with the access-control policy model
we proposed in [15]. The generic trust assessment mechanism
could be adopted at the level of any collaborative environment.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section
II, we present a global overview of our architecture to better
illustrate the context of this work. We follow this by a moti-
vating example to underline our objectives. Then, we discuss
some related work in section III. Further, we present our
formal delegation framework in section IV. In sectionV, the
trust monitoring mechanism is presented and detailed. Then,
simulation results are discussed. Finally, we conclude the paper
and discuss the outline of our future work.
II. ARCHITECTURAL VISION AND CASE STUDY
A. Architecture
Our vision of the enterprise social networking is mainly
based on the communities concept. A community is a logical
group of collaborative subjects sharing collaborative resources.
A community is created by a subject (having the required
rights) which we call creator.
In a professional context, we assume that subjects’ re-
sources are stored within their organizations. In our architec-
ture, the access-control is community centralized. That means
that it is enforced through a common module for all organi-
zations. Thus, when a subject shares a resource with another
subject, an access-control rule will be defined at the level of
the community’s access-control database. Therefore, the access
control decision will be enforced by the community’s access
control module. The access will concretely occur at the level
of the organization’s server that hosts (i.e., owns) the resource.
In such context, organizations would keep their autonomy to
control the access on the shared resources they host. To deal
with this vision, we propose an architecture (Fig.1) in which
organizations remain fully-independent by means of access
constraints added to the initial access control rule (set by a









Fig. 1: Community access control global view.
threshold a requester must satisfy to been granted the access
to the desired resource.
As we use the some subjects’ attributes trust for the access-
control enforcement, we have used an Attribute Based Access
Control [7] ABAC model. We believe that ABAC is the most
suited model for our designed delegation framework, because
it is flexible and ideal for many distributed or rapidly changing
environments [7]. As depicted in Fig 2, our delegation-access-
control framework is composed of five main components
namely:
1) Community Enforcement Service (CES): the cen-
tral unit of the enforcement of the access control
policies. It also serves as a bridge for the interaction
between the other modules.
2) Community Information Store (CIS): the commu-
nity’s information database, where attributes about
resources, subjects and organizations are stored.
3) Community Administration Store (CAdS): the
central community’s delegation-access-control rules
database.
4) Community Decision Service (CDS): the module
responsible for looking for access rules from the
CAdS, generating the event-calculus pattern and en-
forcing the access-control decisions based on the
DEC-reasoner.
5) Community Trust Service (CTS): this service gets
the subject session’s information from the CES and
the subject’s historical information from the CIS,
then, computes the delegatee trust-level, and finally
update it in the CIS.
B. Motivating Example
For the motivating example, we consider the case of a
charitable organization6. To avoid terms ambiguity, we will
call it association. The organization creator – let’s say James –
wants to get the benefits of social networking to facilitate
the collaboration between the association members. Therefore,
James creates a community within the ESN and invites his
partners to join the community. Jessy, the association Blog
manager, is responsible to manage the association’s directory.
Alice, a journalist, writes articles about the association events.




















Fig. 2: Delegation access control architecture.
association. Then, Dave is an officer in the bank in which the
association’s financial funds are placed. Let us consider the
following scenarios:
• CS1: Jessy delegates her rights to Alice for updating
the association’s calendar of solidarity. Alice behavior
within the community is normal and more-or-less
stable.
• CS2: Dave delegates his rights to Oscar to be able to
manage the association’s financial documents stored
at the level of Dave’s bank. Oscar’s experience within
the community reflects a unreliable behavior.
III. STATE OF ART
There has been a lot of research work to address the
delegation issues. The most famous one is RBDM0 (Role-
Based Delegation Model 0), and its variants RBDM1 and
RDM2000 [16], [17], [18], [19]. These proposals are role-
based models for simple, hierarchical role delegation and
multi-step delegation respectively. The limit of those models
is that the minimum delegation unit is the role, and they do
not permit to delegate a subset of the permissions from a given
role. In our context, such partial delegation is very important
as we take into account the members’ attributes heterogeneity.
More precisely, within a collaborative environment, the same
role (status) in different organizations does not allow the same
privileges. In [20], the authors proposed the work entitled a
flexible role-based delegation model with dynamic delegation
role structure. However, this model does not allow ad-hoc user-
to-user delegation as it is based on mapping between roles,
capabilities and permissions.
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language)
is a declarative, XML-based access control policy language
for managing access to resources. A number of approaches
have been proposed that build upon XACML for its usage in
collaborative and distributed environments. In [21], the authors
have developed a formal policy language BelLog that can
express both delegation and composition operators. In [22]
was proposed an XACML-based policy administration control
and delegation model with the use of the Delegent server
[23]. This model is capable to express chains of delegation
and constraints on delegation using XACML. However, basic
access delegations are governed by an administrative autho-
rizations to avoid conflicting delegations. Whilst, with our
formal delegation model, conflicts between delegation rules
is detected automatically during the reasoning process.
[13], [24], [11] are formal delegation models. [24] is
an event-calculus based model used for task delegation in
workflow system. Stephen S. Yau et al propose in [11] a
formal trust based delegation framework, based on AS3 logic.
However, they do not compute the trust based on the user’s
history, they consider a principal as trusted if its identity is
authenticated and the access control permission is granted to
it. The model proposed in [13] allow conditional delegation.
[13] is fully distributed, thus, every organization would have
its own reasoning mechanism to keep its autonomy to control
its resources, otherwise they passively delegate this task to
an external agent. With our approach the reasoning process
is centralized within a federation and keeps organizations’
autonomy by means of setting additional access conditions
with a simple attribute sending.
Another important field in the trust computing research area
deals with the probabilistic models. Indeed, many works use
the beta model [25], [26], [27], [28], [29]. These models use
a parameter Θ to estimate the probability if a principal will
have a good or bad (1 − Θ) behavior regarding an expected
behavior. [30] addresses the challenge by approximating the
unknown parameter Θ based on the user’s interaction history.
We actually do the same, estimating the future user’s behavior
based on its historical behavior. However, in our approach,
we do not need a probabilistic parameter, we instead aim
to determine the severity with which the principal will be
penalized based on the completed actions.
Our proposed framework is semi-distributed, which means
that resources stay hosted and controlled at the level of their
organizations and principals identities are managed by a central
entity under a federation to avoid the problem of identity
attributes heterogeneity. In contrast to traditional XML based
access control policy specification languages, our approach
is formal. This provides a precise, expressive, flexible and
non-ambiguous representation, and also allows for reasoning
about delegation policies (e.g. to find inconsistencies or hard
constraints). We also take advantage from statistical models
to efficiently monitor users’ behavior within the collaborative
environment and adjust the trust level.
IV. DELEGATION AND ACCESS-CONTROL
A. Event-Calculus background
Event-calculus (EC) is a logic programming formalism
for representing events and their effects on environment’s
attributes. It comprises the following elements: A is the set
of events (or actions), F is the set of fluents, T is the set
of time points, and X is a set of objects related to the
particular context. In EC, events are the core concept that
triggers changes to the world. A fluent is anything whose
value is subject to change over time. EC uses predicates to
specify actions and their effects. A detailed discussion about
event-calculus can be found in [31]. Some basic event calculus
predicates used for modelling the proposed framework are:
• Initiates(e, f, t) : fluent f holds after time-point t,
if event e happens at t.
• Happens(e, t) : event e happens at time-point t.
• HoldsAt(f, t) : is true if fluent f holds at time-point t.
The event calculus models are presented using the discrete
event calculus language [32]. We have used the Abductive
reasoning type7, that consists in specifying for up-stream the
initial state(s) and the possible expected goal(s). This blends
well with our vision of delegation policies model, as the
system’s behavior in a given state is susceptible to change
due to the occurrence of some controlled events.
B. Formal delegation framework
The core component of our formal delegation framework
is the delegation-rule (Model2). When it receives an incoming
authorization request, the CDS tries to find the target (Model3)
of the request among a set of delegation-rules. The set of the
delegation-rules is called a Policy (Model1), which groups the
requester’s delegation rules issued from the CAdS. For each
rule, the requester must satisfy the additional trust condition
(Model4). In addition, a delegation-rule is valid if and only if
the delegator is not available (Model5).
When a subject requests a resource as a delegatee, the
system looks for all its delegation rules and groups them into a
common set, the "Policy". Then, the Policy will be evaluated





∀ p, t : Initiates(ApprovePolicy(p), PolicyPermitted(p), t).
∀ p, t : Initiates(DisApprovePolicy(p), PolicyDenied(p), t).
∀ p, t : Initiates(RejectPolicy(p), PolicyNotApplicable(p), t).
#Combination strategy: Permit-takes-precedence:
∀ p, r, t : Happens(ApprovePolicy(p), t)→
∃r : PolicyHasRules(p, r) &HoldsAt(RulePermitted(r), t).
∀ p, r, t : Happens(DisApprovePolicy(p), t)&PolicyHasRules(p, r)→
HoldsAt(RuleDenied(r), t).
∀ p, r, t : Happens(RejectPolicy(p), t)&PolicyHasRules(p, r) →
HoldsAt(RuleNotApplicable(r), t).
Model 1 (Delegation Policy model)
In this policy model, we have defined the policy sort p,
the rule sort r, and some fluents and events. For each event,
we have defined an action precondition axioms. The latter
is a requirement that must be satisfied for the occurrence of
an event. An event whose action precondition is not satisfied
cannot occur. The Policy model is based on the rule combi-
nation strategy permit-takes-precedence. This means that, for
a given requester, if the enforcement system (CES) finds at
least one permitted delegation rule, then, the subject will be
authorized. At the end of the model, we initialize the fluents
as not held, which means that they will still not held until
the raise of their corresponding events which are subjected to
conditions involving rules. Therefore, we would discuss the
7which is discussed by Charniak and McDermott (1985, chap.8), Shanahan
(1989;1997b, chap.17; 2000a), Denecker, Missiaen, and Bruynooghe (1992)
and Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt and Martin (1993) [14]





∀ r, t : Initiates(ApproveRule(r), RulePermitted(r), t).
∀ r, t : Initiates(DisApproveRule(r), RuleDenied(r), t).
∀ r, t : Initiates(RejectRule(r), RuleNotApplicable(r), t).
∀ r, t, s : Happens (ApproveRule(r), t) → HoldsAt (TargetHolds(r), t)
& HoldsAt (TrustHolds(s), t) & HoldsAt (RuleEffectIsPermit(r), t).
∀r, t, s Happens (DisApproveRule(r), t)→ HoldsAt(TargetHolds(r), t)
& [¬HoldsAt(TrustHolds(s), t) | ¬HoldsAt(RuleEffectIsPermit(r), t)].
∀ r, t : Happens (RejectRule(r), t)→HoldsAt (TargetDoesntHold(r), t).
Model 2 (Delegation Rule model)
In this model, we have defined the rule sort r, the subject
sort s, and some events and their corresponding fluents. Unlike
the policy model which combines several rules, the rule model
reasons on rules one-by-one. Each rule is defined by a subject
as a set of attributes (a rule instance is given below). Further,
like in the policy model, we defined some action precondition
axioms. However, a rule’s precondition action axioms depends
on the rule-target (i,e. subject, object and action), the subject’s
trust-level attribute and the rule-effect. The latter refers to the
state of the delegation-rule, i.e., if it remains valid or not.
This will allow the delegator to keep control over resources
it shares, by deactivating and/or activating the delegation-rule
at any time point over the collaborative sessions. This can be
done with a basic update on the rule’s effect attribute at the
level of the CAdS module.
Thus, a delegation-rule is permitted if: (1) the request
attributes match the delegation-rule’s target; (2) the requester’s
trust-level attribute satisfies the threshold set by the organiza-
tion that hosts the requested resource; (3) the rule-effect is
permit (not deny). In the next model (Model3) we describe




∀ r, t : Initiates(MatchParams(r), TargetHolds(r), t).
∀ r, t : Initiates(MisMatchParams(r), TargetDoesntHold(r), t).
∀ r, t : Happens (MatchParams(r), t)→ ¬HoldsAt (TargetHolds(r), t).
∀ r, t : Happens (MisMatchParams(r), t) → ¬HoldsAt (TargetDoesnt-
Hold(r), t).
Model 3 (Rule Target Verification model)
The target-rule model reasons also on the rules one-by-one,
and the events are subjected to some condition action axioms
defined at the level of each rule instance, e.g. the rule depicted
in the Model6. These conditions depend on the matching
between the incoming request attributes and the parameters
defined in the rule, namely: subject, object, action, delegator
and delegator status (on-line /off-line).
Now, let’s get back to the main delegation-rule model
Model2. One of preconditions action axiom is about the
subject’s trust-level : HoldsAt(TrustHolds(s), t). The latter
must be held to approve the delegation-rule. The model for
trust-level assessment is depicted in Model4:





∀ r, t : Initiates(TrustHolds(s), IsTrusted(s), t).
∀ r, t : Initiates(TrustDoesNotHold(s), IsNotTrusted(s), t).
∀ r, t, userTrLevel, orgTHR : Happens (TrustHolds(s), t)
& UserTrlevel(userTrLevel) & OrganizationThold(orgTHR) →
orgTHR ≥ userTrLevel.
∀ r, t, userTrLevel, orgTHR : Happens (TrustDoesNotHold(s), t)
& UserTrlevel(userTrLevel) & OrganizationThold(orgTHR) →
orgTHR < userTrLevel.
Model 4 (Trust Verification model)
In this model, we have defined the subject sort
s, userTrLevel and orgTHR. The last two sorts are
respectively used by the predicates UserTrlevel and
OrganizationThold for checking that the delegatee trust-
level is higher than (satisfies) the organization’s trust-threshold.
Then, Model5 is used to check if a given delegator is
online. We use the predicate Terminates that will set the flu-





∀ s, t : Initiates(Connect(s), OnLine(s), t).
∀S, t : Terminates(Disconnect(s), OnLine(s), t).
∀ r, t : Happens (Connect(s), t) → ¬Online(s).
∀ r, t : Happens (Disconnect(s), t) → Online(s).
Model 5 (delegator Status Verification model)
C. Application to the motivating example
Because the above logical models are not trivial to write,
we have implemented a service [15] at the level of the CDS
module to automatically generate the delegation-rules patterns
based on a set of attributes. Those attributes are defined by
delegators and organizations at the level of the CAdS module.
The service also generates the Event-calculus predicates for
every delegatees request.
The Model6 illustrates the first scenario where Jessy
delegates to Alice the updating rights of the association
calendar. In this model we have the delegation-rule in-
stance DelegAlice1 in which some attributes issued from
Alice’s access request (depicted at the top of the Model7)
must match to the DelegAlice1’s attributes values. In ad-
dition, the rule effect is also set at permit, i.e., fluent
HoldsAt(RuleEffectPermitted(DelegAlice1), 0).
r DelegAlice1
∀ t, s, o, a, d : Happens(MatchParams(DelegAlice1), t) → s =
Alice & o = Calendar & a = PUT & d =
Jessy & ¬HoldsAt(OnLine(Jessy), t).
∀ t, s, o, a, d : Happens(MisMatchParams(DelegAlice1), t) →
s 6= Alice | o 6= Calendar | a 6= PUT | d 6=
Jessy | HoldsAt(OnLine(Jessy), t).
HoldsAt(RuleEffectPermitted(DelegAlice1), 0).
¬HoldsAt(RuleEffectNOTpermitted(DelegAlice1), 0).
Model 6 (Rule pattern example)
The reasoning results showed in Model7 are provided by
the DEC-Reasoner8.The reasoning process is based on a real
time events stream. That means that, at a given time-point,
all the environment attributes (i.e., fluents) are held at true
or false (respectively "+" and "-" at the left of the fluent),
and any event could happen at any time-point. The occurrence
of the delegation-models’ events will cause a state change
on the environment attributes by changing the corresponding
fluents states. Note that, if a fluent state is changed, it will
remain unchangeable until the occurrence of another event able
to modify it. The events are monitored by the CES and are
continuously injected in the DEC-reasoner through the CDS.
Then, when fluents’ states change, events that are related to
precondition-action-axioms that involve the changed fluents
could happen (or not) over the continuous reasoning time-
interval.
#Request inputs:















Model 7 (Request evaluation example)
To facilitate the understanding of the reasoning results, we
ordered the occurrence of the different events in different time-
points in order to separate them for better clarity. We suppose
that at time point 0, the delegator Jessy is offline. At the same
time-point, the event for checking Alice’s trust-level happens.
Then, the fluent that states that Alice is a trusted person is held
at time-point 1. Next, the same occurs for the rule-target at the
time-points 1 and 2. Finally, after all delegation-rule event’s
preconditions are satisfied, the delegation will be authorized.
This example illustrates only one rule, and due to space
limitation, we cannot present another delegation-rule(s) for
illustrating the reasoning results on a Policy. But, if the latter
contains, among other delegation rules, the delegation-rule
instance DelegAlice1, then, for the same request attributes,
the result obtained after the reasoning based on the policy
model (model1) will approve the request.
V. TRUST ASSESSMENT
A. Trust assessment background
The other part of our proposal deals with trust. Our trust
assessment mechanism is based on the subject’s historical data
collected over its collaborative sessions. A session is the time-
interval used for collecting subjects’ logs. For every subject,
we monitor the evolution of its trust-level regarding its past
sessions. Then, based on the evolution, we determine how to
assess the subject’s behavior during the next session. From a
security point of view, we aim to detect the negative behavior
8http://decreasoner.sourceforge.net/
performed by a subject. From this perspective, several metrics
could be included under the scope of the negative unauthorized
behavior, e.g., misuse on access gained data, virus implant,
etc.. To simplify the assessment we only focused on the illegal
access requests. An illegal access request is automatically
rejected by the community’s access control mechanism. We
assume that each subject’s access request(s) with the corre-
sponding access control decisions are collected, aggregated and
stored within the subject’s log file.
The main idea of our algorithm is as follows. To compute
the trust-level for a given subject – James – the CTS computes
at the end of every session the trust-level evolution rate
between James’ last session and the median of the remaining
ones. Consequently, the CTS computes the penalty-factor to
apply on James’ possible illegal actions collected at the end of
his next session. Note that, for each subject, the penalty-factor
is evolutive. This means that, it may change at every session
(i.e., it may increase, decrease or remain stable) depending on
the evolution of the subject’s past trust-level.
B. Trust assessment formalization
In our context, we consider that the subject’s trust-level
decreases and/or increases at a rate proportional to the number
of its illegal actions, i.e., number of denied requests. Further,
in our context, the trust assessment process allows us to en-
hance the basic access-control mechanism in the collaborative
environment. Therefore, a rapid interception of a suspicious
subject’s behavior is required to be taken into account for
the access-control process. Therefore, we formalize the trust-
assessment scheme with an exponential function that take the
subject’s parameters: number of denied requests NbDeny and
the last penalty-factor ρ (as described in algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Trust assessment
1: function TrustComputing(ρ, nbDeny)
2: tr = exp (−ρ ∗ nbDeny);
3: return tr;
4: end function
As we said above the penalty-factor ρ value may change
after the end of every session. The increase (or decrease) of
ρ will allow a subject to pay attention to its behavior. This
behavior has a direct impact on the evolution of ρ as when
a subject doesn’t try to access unauthorized resource(s), the
applied ρ will remain low.
To compute subject’s ρ that will be applied for its next
session, we first need to compute the subject’s initial trust-
level tr0 based on its historical past experiences stored by the
CIS. Then, we need to measure the evolution rate λ between
the initial trust-level and the one tr computed at the end of
the subject’s last session.
Let’s assume that n is the number of a subject’s collabora-
tive sessions. To compute tr0, the CTS computes the average
of the (n − 1) subject’s historical trust values. However, the
CTS gives more importance (weighting it by 2) to the last
experience (n− 1) regarding the remaining ones (n− 2).
Then, to compute the trust evolution-rate λ, the CTS mea-
sures the change rate between tr0 and tr using the exponential
decay/growth function. Thus, if tr is higher than tr0, then, λ
will be a positive value. Otherwise, λ will be a negative value.
Consequently, if the evolution is positive (i.e., λ > 0), it will
narrow down the penalty-factor ρ. Conversely, ρ will arise.
However, an untrusted subject must not be able to increase
its penalty-factor as fast as a trusted subject. On the other
hand, a trusted subject must be penalized with more severity
than an untrusted subject. This means that the subject’s trust
category [33] interpreted by its last penalty-factor has a direct
impact on the ρ evolution (more details below). Therefore, we
weight the obtained λ with the reverse of the subject’s last
penalty-factor, (i.e., 1−ρ). Further, we need also to soften the
sudden high change of λ, so, we divide the obtained result
by the community-severity-factor ς . The latter is a subjective
parameter defined by the community administrator. The higher
this parameter is, the harder for subjects to decrease (or
increase) their respective ρ is.
Algorithm 2 trust evolution factor
1: function TrEvolFact(tr0, tr, ς , ρ)
2: λ = [(ln(tr/tr0)/2) ∗ (1− ρ)]/ς;
3: return λ;
4: end function
As we said above, the computation of new penalty-factor
ρ is based on the result of the last evolution-rate λ. Therefore,
we have two kinds of penalty-factors, the discrete penalty-
factor ρ and the continuous penalty-factor %. The latter % is
used to analyze the continuous changes of a subject’s behavior,
while the former ρ is applied for penalizing the subject’s
possible illegal actions. Then, we compute the penalty-factor ρ
as follows. First, we subtract the current trust evolution rate λ
from the last continuous penalty-factor %. Then, we discretize
the obtained % value based on the discrete community interval
(DiscP [ ]). The latter is one of the parameters the community
creator defines during the community creation process to spec-
ify the categories of subjects’ trust, e.g. full-trusted, trusted or
untrusted person. Each label corresponds to a real value. Note
that, the closer the discrete values are, the less the trust-values
drop after undesired subjects’ behaviors.
Algorithm 3 trust penalty-factor
1: function penaltyFactor(%, ρ, λ)
2: % = %− λ;
3: ρ = PenaltyDiscritization(%,DiscP [ ]);
4: return ρ;
5: end function
According to our λ computing function, the penalty-
factor’s discrete values must always be ∈]0, 1[. Because if ρ
is equal to zero, then, no penalty is applied in the community.
However, if is equal to 1, the evolution rate will converge to
be equal to zero in the upper bound. That’s why it is recom-
mended to use a discrete interval DiscP [ ] ⊆ ]0, 1[, except if
the trust assessment would be intentionally deactivated.
For the PenaltyDiscritization procedure, we use the
binary search algorithm to look for the nearest discrete value
in the community discrete interval regarding the computed
penalty-factor ρ. The discretization procedure is used to pre-
vent subjects to change immediately their penalty-factor after
a collaborative session. In addition, when % value exceeds
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Fig. 3: Trust assessment function.
consequently reduced to the DiscP [ ]’s lower and/or upper
bounds respectively. Therefore, the same penalty value will
be applied to all subjects of a given community.
C. Illustration
For illustrative purposes, we use the following discrete
interval DiscP [ ] = [0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 0.9], which can be in-
terpreted as the following discrete labels: Very Trustworthy,
Trustworthy, Untrustworthy, Very Untrustworthy based on [33]
trust model. Furthermore, we suppose that the maximum
accepted unauthorized access attempts before a requester is
suspended to be maxCommNbDeny = 15. The results of
such settings with the use of our approach for trust computing
are depicted in the figure, Fig. 3. As we can notice the figure,
the more penalty-factor ρ will increase, the more the trust
level will decrease towards the increasing of the number of
the unauthorized requests.
VI. EXPERIMENTATION
To evaluate our trust assessment approach, we have made
some tests based on two subject experiences, namely, Alice
and Oscar. This service was implemented in the OpenPaaS
project9. However, we currently lack real users’ relevant bench-
marks. Thus, the simulation done shows the various impacts
on the trust-level.
A. Presentation
The session duration for collecting logs is subjective, and
depend on the community administrator (i.e., every hour, day,
month, trimester or more). In addition, the number of the
denied requests collected after each session is supposed to be
significant, relevant and not corrupted. In this work, we do not
tackle those challenges, however, they could be handled with
machine learning approaches based on subjects’ experiences,
that in a real case scenario, will depend on several parameters,
like session spent time, interaction frequency, etc. Future work
will be made in this concern with the use of a real experimental
subjects Logs. Moreover, In this work we don’t address the
problem of initializing new subject’s parameters, i.e., the one
who has joined a collaborative session. We instead attribute
average values, e.g., 0.4, 0.5, 0.6.
9https://research.linagora.com/display/openpaas/Open+PaaS+Overview



















Fig. 4: Trust evolution for consistent behavior.



















Fig. 5: Trust evolution for inconsistent behavior.
We consider that our two subjects Alice and Oscar start
with the same initial values, namely, tr0 = 0.5, tr = 0.6,
ρ = 0.1, % = 0.1. To simplify the illustration of the experimen-
tal results, we have choose a community-severity-factor ς equal
to 1, which means that the ρ evolution will be fast. The dashed
graph shows the evolution of the penalty-factor ρ, whereas,
the plain one shows the trust-level evolution. We consider
Alice as a trusted person with a consistent behavior. Therefore,
Alice’s behavior is a vector of random values between 3 and 6
nbDeny. On the other hand, Oscar’s behavior is inconsistent.
We have defined four different behavior vectors for Oscar.
In the first one, Oscar has a normal behavior for a given
session period. Then, for the next period, Oscar will have an
exemplary behavior, which will normally decrease his penalty-
factor. To check this, for the third period Oscar will switch
to the normal behavior. Further, Oscar’s undertakes a suspi-
cious behavior by a high frequency of illegal access requests.
Therefore, after such behavior Oscar must be penalized. Then,
for the fourth period, Oscar will switch again to the normal
behavior Normal2 which is better than the first one (in term
of the number of rejected requests).
Normal 5 10 9 5 8 9 7 8 5 6 8
Normal2 4 3 2 5 4 1 4 2 3 5 1 2
Good 4 3 5 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 1
Bad 10 4 3 2 14 4 1 2 11 3 1 2
TABLE I: Oscars’s behaviors
B. Discussion
Fig 5 shows the Oscar’s trust evolution over sessions.
The double-line fragment shows the good period, whereas, the
single-line one shows the bad period. Thus, as we can see Fig5
graphic, after the good period, Oscar’s trust level increases
because, for the same behavior (Normal1), he obtains better
trust scores than the initial ones.
On the other hand, Fig 4 shows Alice’s trust evolution. As
Alice has a stable more-or-less good behavior, her trust scores
remain stable over the collaborative sessions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a formal delegation framework
designed for enterprise social networks to allow subjects to
delegate access to their resources when they can not be
available. Our Event-Based delegation model aims to reason
about the delegation events that happens within the collabo-
rative environment to manage the delegation’s access-control
policies.
This delegation model is used under a central federated
architecture to deal with the heterogeneity issues within col-
laborative platforms. However, collaborative organizations are
not obliged to fully delegate the access control management to
a central third party. The traditional delegation access control
approaches are either user-centric or organization-centric and
we have advocated to bridge the gap between them. Because,
in our architecture, organizations are able to keep control
over their resources (i.e., autonomy) by means of fine grained
constraints concerning the required external principals’ trust-
level. Those constraints are combined with the users’ access
control delegation rules, and are computed based on a real-time
monitoring of principals’ behaviors. For this, we have proposed
an efficient trust assessment mechanism and showed the trust-
level variation results based on simulated users’ behaviors.
For future work, we aim to improve our delegation model
by considering, delegation of co-owned resources and revo-
cation, timed and multi-step delegation [16], and try to get
a real relevant benchmarks about users’ behaviors, in order to
validate our trust assessment approach with better experimental
evaluation.
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